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Türkiye’s Emerging Model of Geoeconomic Power: From the Balkans to the Caucasus

Türkiye is building regional influence through an integrated model of economic, corporate, diplomatic, and military power across the Balkans and Caucasus.

Türkiye’s Emerging Model of Geoeconomic Power: From the Balkans to the Caucasus
Credit: hadynyah
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Türkiye’s growing external influence is best understood not as a collection of bilateral initiatives, but as an increasingly integrated model of power projection. Economic instruments, infrastructure, finance, corporate capabilities, defence-industrial capacity, diplomatic networks, and soft power increasingly reinforce one another, allowing Ankara to translate economic and industrial capabilities into broader strategic influence.

This model is particularly visible in two distinct theatres. In the Western Balkans, Turkish influence is primarily expressed through investment, construction, infrastructure, finance and corporate networks, complemented by development cooperation and cultural engagement. In the Caucasus and Caspian region, the emphasis shifts towards energy, transit infrastructure, logistics and connectivity, with Türkiye positioned as a strategic hub between Central Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus and European markets. Türkiye is therefore not applying an identical template everywhere, but adapting a common strategic architecture to regional conditions.

With a population of around 85 million and a GDP of approximately US$1.6 trillion, Türkiye is a major emerging economy and a member of the G20 and OECD. Its geography provides access to the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Mediterranean, while its defence industry has expanded across unmanned systems, missiles, land platforms, naval systems and other technologies. The significance of these assets lies in Ankara’s ability to integrate them into mutually reinforcing networks. The Western Balkans and Caucasus therefore provide useful case studies of how this integration operates in practice and where its limits become visible.

The Western Balkans: Investment, Infrastructure and Corporate Networks

The Western Balkans provide the clearest example of Türkiye’s project- and investment-led model of external influence. Turkish engagement extends across Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Croatia, combining development assistance, infrastructure construction, banking, tourism, aviation, energy and logistics.

TİKA, Türkiye’s development cooperation agency, has been active throughout the Balkans in education, healthcare, agriculture, infrastructure, institutional capacity-building and cultural heritage. Its restoration of Ottoman-era mosques, bridges and historic sites adds a cultural dimension to this presence. Such activities should not automatically be interpreted as geopolitical control. Their strategic relevance lies rather in the durable institutional relationships and long-term Turkish presence they create across local administrative and societal networks.

The commercial dimension is particularly visible in Albania and Kosovo. Turkish companies have established positions in infrastructure, aviation, banking and energy. Limak operates Pristina International Airport and has also been involved in the development of Vlora Airport, while Air Albania provides another example of Turkish participation in regional aviation infrastructure. In Montenegro, Global Ports Holding operates the Port of Bar’s container terminal, illustrating Türkiye’s wider interest in logistics and maritime infrastructure.

Serbia represents another important case. Turkish companies have expanded into construction, infrastructure, manufacturing and renewable energy, including plans for a large solar facility in Sremska Mitrovica. In Croatia, an EU member and interface between the Western Balkans and the European economic space, Doğuş Group has developed positions in Adriatic tourism, marinas and related real-estate infrastructure. Turkish financial interests are also represented by KentBank, following Süzer Group’s acquisition of Banka Brod in 2011.

The strategic significance lies less in the scale of any individual project than in their interaction. Development institutions create access; financial intermediaries facilitate capital; and private companies execute projects and establish long-term commercial relationships. This does not amount to Turkish control of the region. It creates channels through which economic presence can generate political and strategic influence.

For practitioners, the important point is the accumulation of access: infrastructure, corporate networks, local decision-makers, financial relationships and positions in strategic sectors. The Balkan model is therefore based on numerous engagements that reinforce one another over time.

The Caucasus and Caspian Basin: Energy, Transit and Connectivity

The same strategic architecture is applied differently in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin. Here, Türkiye relies less on direct capital deployment and more on its position within energy, transit, logistics and connectivity networks.

Azerbaijan is central as a major energy producer, while Georgia provides a critical transit corridor between the Caspian and European markets. Türkiye’s position is anchored in the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), approximately 1,800 kilometres long, which carries Azerbaijani gas across Türkiye and connects with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline as part of the Southern Gas Corridor to European consumers. Its strategic significance extends beyond energy supply: physical and institutional interdependencies link production, transit and consumption, strengthening Türkiye’s position as a gateway between the Caspian and Europe.

The Middle Corridor provides a broader expression of this role. The route connects China and Central Asia through the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye towards European markets. Its relevance extends beyond freight transport to logistics, energy, digital connectivity and potentially critical raw-material supply chains. Türkiye’s objective is therefore not necessarily to own every asset along the corridor, but to increase its strategic value as a central node within wider regional networks.

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), comprising Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with additional observers, provides an institutional framework for economic, transport, energy, cultural and political cooperation. It should not be understood as a conventional Turkish-led bloc. Its members maintain diversified relations with China, Russia and Europe. Its significance instead lies in providing a platform through which overlapping interests can be coordinated.

Turkmenistan adds another potential dimension. Its substantial natural-gas reserves could eventually provide additional supplies towards European markets, although infrastructure, financing, regulatory requirements, transit arrangements and commercial conditions constrain the feasibility of large-scale exports. Türkiye’s geographical position nevertheless gives Ankara a direct strategic interest in any future westward energy route.

The corridor logic also creates potential overlap between transport, energy and broader connectivity agendas, meaning that an infrastructure position can generate relevance across several economic sectors at once. The contrast with the Balkans is instructive. In the Balkans, Turkish influence is generated primarily through project execution, corporate investment and financial intermediation. In the Caucasus and Caspian region, leverage derives more from Türkiye’s position within strategic networks. In both cases, economic and infrastructural relevance is converted into durable strategic leverage.

The difference is therefore one of mechanism rather than strategic logic: where the Balkans provide multiple entry points into national economies, the Caucasus and Caspian region provide opportunities to occupy critical positions within cross-border networks. This distinction is particularly relevant to investors and policymakers assessing Türkiye’s exposure to regional infrastructure and corridor development. It also explains why connectivity projects can have significance beyond their immediate commercial returns. A route that increases Türkiye’s importance to energy, trade or logistics flows can strengthen its bargaining position across several sectors simultaneously, provided that the underlying infrastructure remains commercially viable and politically supported.

Strategic Assessment: Opportunities and Constraints

The two case studies point to several opportunities for Türkiye in an increasingly fluid and competitive environment around the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. Russia’s war against Ukraine has altered regional power distribution and constrained Moscow’s ability to concentrate resources across multiple theatres. This creates additional space for Türkiye to strengthen its role in energy, transit, logistics and regional connectivity, although Russia remains an important actor. The Middle Corridor, the Southern Gas Corridor and Türkiye’s maritime infrastructure provide channels through which Ankara can increase its strategic relevance without matching the capital resources of China or Gulf sovereign wealth funds.

Several industries are particularly relevant. Energy infrastructure and transit can reinforce Türkiye’s position between Caspian producers and European consumers; logistics and port operations can strengthen its role as a Eurasian transport node; and defence-industrial exports can create additional commercial and strategic relationships. Türkiye’s established defence-industrial base, developed after decades of external arms dependence, supports this channel, with systems such as the TB2 and KAAN illustrating its export and technological ambitions. Its merchant fleet, shipyards, ports and logistics capabilities add a maritime dimension, linking commercial networks with the strategic importance of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The Mavi Vatan concept reflects this broader maritime dimension.

The expansion of these channels depends, however, on regional demand, financing and the ability to maintain competitive industrial capacity. The principal constraints are macroeconomic. Persistent inflation, high financing costs, currency volatility and energy dependence limit Türkiye’s capacity to finance large-scale external expansion. International developments can intensify these pressures through energy-price movements, tighter global financial conditions, disruptions to trade routes or renewed geopolitical risk, transmitting external shocks into financing costs, import prices and investment capacity. Türkiye’s geopolitical reach can therefore exceed its capacity for large-scale capital deployment.

The wider competitive environment also imposes limits. China possesses greater financial resources and extensive infrastructure and trade networks; Gulf states are expanding investment activities; European institutions remain major actors in the Western Balkans; and Russia and Iran retain significant regional assets. Türkiye’s model therefore depends on combining several instruments while maintaining access to capital, industrial competitiveness and technology.

Domestic political and economic developments will determine how far these opportunities can be scaled. Changes in monetary policy, regulatory conditions, investment priorities and the wider business environment can either strengthen or constrain Türkiye’s ability to mobilise capital and sustain external expansion. Bilateral and regional agreements can have a similar effect where they create durable cooperation in energy, transport, defence or trade.  The Makkah defence pact illustrates how such agreements can extend existing Turkish industrial and strategic capabilities into new regional relationships, although its long-term institutional and operational implications remain uncertain.

Conclusion

Türkiye’s emerging model is neither simply economic expansion nor conventional geopolitical power projection. It is an increasingly integrated system in which investment, infrastructure, corporate activity, energy corridors, defence production, diplomacy and institutional networks reinforce one another.

The Western Balkans demonstrate how project execution, corporate networks and financial relationships can generate long-term strategic access. The Caucasus and Caspian Basin demonstrate how Türkiye can derive leverage from its position within energy, transit and connectivity networks. The opportunities for further influence depend on whether Ankara can expand these channels while managing macroeconomic constraints, external dependencies and competition.

Türkiye does not therefore exercise a Turkish sphere of control. Its emerging model is better understood as a conditional transformation of economic, industrial and institutional capabilities into a broader geoeconomic and geopolitical toolkit.

Eduard Vasilj

Eduard Vasilj

Eduard Vasilj combines government advisory experience with nearly 20 years in senior executive roles. He advises governments, sovereign wealth funds and financial institutions on geoeconomic strategy and geopolitical risk across Europe and the GCC.

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