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# The Future of EU Crypto-Asset Oversight
- URL: https://www.geoeconomics.fi/the-future-of-eu-crypto-asset-oversight/
- Published: 2026-11-20T15:42:40.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-20T15:48:44.000Z
- Description: Europe's push to centralise crypto supervision risks undermining financial sovereignty, regulatory resilience, and innovation. A Third Way offers binding convergence without institutional centralisation.
- Author: Prof. Christopher P Buttigieg Ph.D.
- Tags: Argument, Editor's Picks

The European Commission’s Market Integration and Supervision Package (MISP), published on 4 December 2025, proposes transferring primary supervisory authority over Crypto-Asset Service Providers (CASPs) from National Competent Authorities (NCAs) to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In a paper co-written with Dan Hanqvist, we subject this legislative proposal to a rigorous legal, institutional, and geoeconomic critique. We argue that what is presented as a technical refinement in service of the Savings and Investment Union constitutes a constitutional scale shift and an exercise in institutional statecraft. 

By relocating supervisory authority upward to a Paris-based supranational agency, the MISP threatens to dismantle the polycentric supervisory equilibrium established under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), undermine operational resilience under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), and concentrate regulatory and market gravity within a singular core hub. In place of outright centralisation, we advance an alternative model of enforced supervisory convergence that preserves national expertise while binding Member States to strict compliance standards.

### The Geoeconomics of Supervisory Centralisation

To appreciate the stakes of the MISP, it is necessary to begin with the architecture originally forged during the MiCA negotiations. MiCA deliberately preserved a cooperative federal balance by vesting NCAs with primary licensing and supervisory responsibility for CASPs while assigning ESMA a secondary, coordinating mandate oriented toward supervisory convergence. That design recognised the heterogeneity of national financial ecosystems across the Union and positioned national supervisors as the immediate frontline guardians of market integrity. 

The MISP disrupts this settlement by recasting regulatory design as an instrument of geoeconomics, understood here as the strategic deployment of regulatory frameworks and institutional mandates to secure economic and geopolitical advantage. Rather than functioning as a neutral administrative adjustment, the Single Rulebook becomes a vehicle for redrawing the Union’s financial geography. Central to this dynamic is supervisory proximity. Market participants operating in volatile and technically intricate digital asset markets rely heavily on immediate physical and communicative access to their primary regulators to navigate compliance uncertainties in real time. Shifting authority from decentralised national bodies to ESMA in Paris creates a powerful gravitational pull, incentivising premier CASPs to relocate toward the supranational seat of power and thereby reinforcing France’s broader Choose France strategy to capture European technology and financial intellectual capital.

This geoeconomic dimension is situated within longer-standing intra-Union debates over financial leadership following the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2020\. French political and monetary leadership, including President Emmanuel Macron, former Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire, and the Banque de France, has consistently championed deeper capital markets integration paired with centralised supranational oversight by ESMA over major non-bank financial actors, alongside assertive postures regarding crypto passporting. While intra-Union competition is not inherently pathological, cohesion within a compound polity depends on respecting constitutional boundaries, chief among them subsidiarity and proportionality. These principles mark the dividing line between a federation of states and a centralised federal union, and the MISP’s transfer of CASP supervision calls into question both constitutional coherence and Union financial sovereignty.

### Centralisation Can Produce Structural Risks

The Commission’s official justification for centralisation rests on the premise that national oversight is unduly fragmented across divergent NCA practices and that existing Union tools are inadequate for consistent cross-border supervision in fast-moving digital markets. Centralising oversight in ESMA is therefore framed as a necessary step toward a level playing field, gap mitigation, and economies of scale under the Savings and Investment Union agenda. 

We contend that this efficiency narrative masks a process of supervisory enclosure. Rather than generating benign economies of scale, centralisation extracts regulatory intelligence and human capital from peripheral Member States to consolidate authority at the centre. A rigid, uniform supervisory model imposed from above is poorly matched to a rapidly evolving, technology-driven sector that depends on agile feedback loops and granular local knowledge. By raising what we term a supervisory moat around market entry, centralised oversight risks favouring large, established financial incumbents over nimble entrants while eroding the polycentric innovation that MiCA’s passporting architecture was designed to foster.

Operational realities compound these structural risks. Supervising an estimated pool of more than six hundred CASPs under MiCA, assuming roughly one and a half full-time equivalents per entity, implies an immediate demand for over nine hundred specialised professionals. Because ESMA cannot conjure this expertise ex nihilo, centralisation triggers a supervisory brain drain, drawing seasoned distributed ledger technology and crypto specialists away from smaller and mid-sized FinTech hubs such as Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Latvia, and Lithuania toward Paris. This institutional predation hollows out national regulatory ecosystems while leaving ESMA exposed to severe resourcing and operational bottlenecks. 

Simultaneously, the MISP fails to simplify the multi-layered licensing reality of modern CASPs, which routinely combine MiCA activities with investment services under MiFID II, electronic money issuance under electronic money regimes, anti-money laundering obligations, and ICT resilience duties. Instead of streamlining oversight, centralisation produces a Supervisory Square, fracturing authority across ESMA, national competent authorities, the European Anti-Money Laundering Authority, and designated DORA lead overseers. Navigating four distinct regulatory vectors imposes a heavy compliance tax that disproportionately burdens smaller innovators while insulating entrenched incumbents, thereby diluting the Union-in-Diversity model through which national authorities test and refine common rules in real time.

The tension between the MISP and DORA represents perhaps the most acute systemic hazard we identified in the paper. DORA rests on the premise of integrated, holistic ICT risk supervision anchored by a single competent authority capable of evaluating an entity’s full technological risk profile. Splitting oversight so that ESMA governs a firm’s MiCA activities while national authorities retain responsibility for adjacent investment or payment lines fractures accountability and weakens integrated security. 

These difficulties become especially pronounced in Threat-Led Penetration Testing under frameworks such as TIBER-EU. Effective threat-led testing depends on localised threat intelligence, domestic incident response knowledge, and close coordination with national Computer Emergency Response Teams and domestic infrastructure operators. Centralising authority in ESMA either strips testing of vital jurisdictional specificity or forces cumbersome coordination across institutions, turning a proactive resilience instrument into a formalistic exercise and diminishing the Union’s defensive sovereignty.

Beyond these operational and security frictions, we argue that the MISP is empirically premature. MiCA only recently reached full application, yet the proposal seeks to dismantle its decentralised architecture before any systematic empirical evaluation of its performance has been undertaken. Unlike systemic banking crises that warranted deep supranational integration in banking supervision, the crypto-asset sector does not pose an existential threat to the foundations of the Union’s financial system, making radical centralisation disproportionate. At the same time, ESMA already possesses statutory instruments – including peer reviews, common supervisory actions, and breach-of-Union-law procedures – that remain underutilised as vehicles for harmonisation.

### The Third Way: Enforced Supervisory Convergence

To resolve the tension between cross-border consistency and polycentric vitality without succumbing to supervisory enclosure, we propose a Third Way grounded in enforced supervisory convergence. Rather than stripping NCAs of their supervisory mandates, this framework elevates ESMA into a decisive supranational arbiter backed by hard-law accountability. Its foundation rests on two core enforcement pillars:

1. Binding implementation mandates that convert soft-law peer review findings and supervisory recommendations into legally enforceable compliance trajectories governed by strict, irreversible timelines, eliminating strategic delay by national authorities.
2. Introducing pecuniary accountability, where financial penalties are attached directly to national regulators that fail to execute mandatory convergence measures within prescribed windows, thereby creating a credible budgetary deterrent against non-compliance.

These two enforcement pillars are reinforced by five operational mechanisms designed to knit national supervisors into a cohesive supervisory central nervous system: 

1. Data centralisation and methodological harmonisation equip all NCAs with shared analytical toolkits and common supervisory data baselines so that risk assessments proceed from uniform analytical foundations.
2. Epistemic networks and structured knowledge cohesion, sustained through joint training, cross-border workshops, and shared supervisory practices, foster alignment in professional judgment and supervisory culture across Member States.
3. Direct supranational participation embeds ESMA officials within selected national supervisory engagements, bridging macro-level rule design and micro-level market realities without severing local accountability.
4. Decentralised centres of excellence designate specific national authorities with deep domain expertise to anchor specialised technical research and shared supervisory support for the wider network, preserving distributed intellectual capital rather than concentrating it in a single hub.
5. Finally, uniform risk-based engagement establishes common risk frameworks and minimum inspection cycles for high-risk entities regardless of domicile.

Taken together, enforced supervisory convergence offers distinct institutional and geoeconomic advantages over the MISP. By anchoring standards through shared methodology and enforceable sanctions rather than institutional absorption, it preserves jurisdictional proximity, local market intelligence, and competitive pluralism across the Union’s twenty-seven Member States. It prevents any single national strategy, such as Choose France, from becoming a structural single point of failure for European digital finance. 

Crucially, enforced convergence is reversible and provisional, allowing policymakers to stress-test and refine MiCA supervision in live markets before contemplating irreversible constitutional restructuring. Ultimately, we contend that Europe’s resilience in digital finance depends on upholding subsidiarity and proportionality through distributed excellence and binding convergence rather than pursuing an administratively heavy monoculture.